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THE TRANSIENT RULE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION:
THE "POWER" MYTH AND FORUM CONVENIENS
ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIGi
THE "RULE": PERSONAL SERVICE WITHIN THE STATE
SITTING in the lounge of his plane on a nonstop flight over New York, a
citizen of California is banded a summons. For many years to come, to his
great expense and greater annoyance, he will have to defend a law suit in a
New York court three thousand miles away from his home, even though the
plaintiff may be a spiteful competitor alleging a fanciful claim dating back
many years to a trip abroad. For "transitory actions" may be brought in any
court that has jurisdiction of the defendant, and anyone "personally present"
in a state is subject to its "jurisdiction," "whether he is permanently or only
temporarily there."'
The dogma that will herein be called the "transient rule" has it that in per-
sonam jurisdiction of an individual defendant can be acquired by mere physical
service of process, even in a forum where neither plaintiff nor defendant
resides and which has no connection with the cause of action.2 The inade-
quacy of this rule, and its contrast with the law prevailing elsewhere in the
world,3 have often been stressed. A rule compelling the traveler "to run the
fProfessor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
1. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 77-78 (1934).
2. The present discussion excludes: the somewhat different rules of jurisdiction over
corporations, which involve other problems and will therefore be dealt with only collateral-
ly; jurisdiction over individual defendants who have expressly or impliedly consented to
the jurisdiction and can, therefore, hardly complain of inconvenience; and quasi in rem
jurisdiction which, though often providing a means of suing a distant defendant, does not
entail either the opportunities for a captious choice of the forum or the severe penalties for
a judgment by default inherent in the transient rule, since both choice and effect of judg-
ment are limited to the defendant's property situated in the forum state.
3. In civil law countries personal service requirements are procedural in character
and do not "go to the jurisdiction"; and personal jurisdiction, or "competency" ratione
personae, is never based on the mere physical "presence" of the defendant. See Nuss-
BAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 192 (1943). For a historical analysis
see 2 NEUMEYER, DIE GEMEINRECHTLICHE ENTWICKELUNG DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT-
UND STRAFRECn'Ts 42 (1916). Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts Over Foreigners, 26
HARv. L. REx'. 193, 199, 283 (1912), ignores the difference. Compare WESTLAKE, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 90-94 (1858) ; MICHAELI, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 350 (1947)
(Swedish law) ; Pillett, Jurisdiction in Actions Between Foreigners, 18 -ARv. L. REV.
325, 335 (1905) ; Francescakis, Comptence trangre et jugement tranger, 42 REvuE
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gauntlet of such litigation under threat of snap judgment" offers "premiums
to scavengers of sham and stale claims at every center of travel."4 The rule
"may result in trying the suit in a State in which no part of the operative facts
occurred and in which neither of the parties lives," so that "the defendant may
be called upon to defend in a place with which he is unfamiliar," 6 and the forum
may not be "in a favorable position to deal intelligently either with the facts
or with the law."'7 To Minor, the best known commentator on conflicts law in
the period between Story and Beale, the related rule permitting an adminis-
trator to sue a debtor transiently in the state of his appointment was "closer
akin to robbery than to justice." A more recent author can find "nothing so
irrational as the doctrine of local and transitory actions conventionally applied
in the interstate field ;"9 and another would reject wholesale the current "ar-
chaic legal techniques" of jurisdiction.10
Some of the apparently insoluble problems of interstate jurisdiction have
been caused by these shortcomings. Thus in the case of Fauntleroy v. Lure,11
Mississippi was compelled under the full faith and credit clause to enforce a
Missouri judgment based on either a deliberate disregard of, or a glaring error
about, Mississippi law, in a case involving "acts of residents of Mississippi,
done within that state, which were violative of the public policy of the State
and which were criminal."' 2 This case would never have arisen had the Mis-
souri court not "succeeded in getting personal service upon" a defendant
"temporarily in the State."' 3
These shortcomings of the transient rule are serious enough; further dif-
CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV 1 (France 1953) ; and the excellent article by
Ross, Tire Shifting Basis of Jurisdiction, 17 MINN. L. REv. 146, 147 (1932). In contrast
to the RESTATEMENT, CONLICT OF LAWS, §§ 77-78 (1934), the RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS
§ 7 (1942) has adopted at least the term, if not the concept of "competency." For the law
of Louisiana, see State v. Sandlin, 21 La. Ann. 258 (1869); HAWES, JURISDICTION OF
COURTS 23 (1886). For the "Forum Competens" of older Scottish law, see 11 Mor. Dict.
Dec. 4779-81 (1803). But cf. GIBB, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JURISDICTION IN ENG-
LAND AND SCOTLAND 1 (1926). As to the similarity of early American and civil law con-
cepts of jurisdiction, see text at notes 124-30 infra. For an indication of an impending rap-
prochement, see Boskey & Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack: October Term,
1939, 40 CoLuM. L. Rv. 1006 (1940).
4. Hamersley, J., dissenting in Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 143, 34
Atl. 714, 729 (1895).
5. Cooic, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 100 (1949).
6. STUMBERG, CONFLICT or LAWS 73 n.23 (2d ed. 1951). See also Ross, supra note 3,
at 159.
7. Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 ILL. L. REV. 427, 438 (1929).
8. MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS 285 (1901).
9. Foster, Place of Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment,
44 HARV. L. REv. 41, 48 (1930). See also Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 id.
1217, 1222; text at note 101 infra.
10. DEAN, [1954] ANNUAL SuRvEY or AMSERICAN LAW 33, 35 (1955).
11. 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
12. Id. at 241.
13. Id. at 239. See also id. at 234.
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ficulties are raised by the impact of our law of personal jurisdiction on the
entire field of American conflicts law. A systematic analysis of this impact is
beyond the scope of this study, but an example may serve here to illustrate
the close though often neglected connection between the laws of jurisdiction
and of choice-of-law. There is little disagreement as to the unsatisfactory state
of our conflicts law bearing upon the statute of limitations. It now seems
settled that any .state is free to apply its own statute rather than that under
which the cause of action arose.14 Yet by applying the local statute a court may
deny the valid claim of a nonresident creditor who was compelled by our law
of personal jurisdiction to follow his debtor into the state of the forum. On the
other hand, a court may offer its own law for the revival of a stale claim by a
nonresident creditor who, again by our law of personal jurisdiction, was en-
abled to "catch" his unwary debtor in the state of the forum.15
Choice-of-law problems can no longer be considered to be governed by what
Justice Holmes called the "first principles of legal thinking,"'16 or what the
Restaters refer to as "legislative jurisdiction." 17 Due process as a vehicle of
constitutional control of choice-of-law may be obsolescent,' 8 and the same fate
may perhaps be expected for the still current use of "full faith and credit to
statutes" for a similar purpose. 19 We may have to acquiesce in the fact that
14. See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953). But cf. Order of Com-
mercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) ; Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Delta
& Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934) ; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See
Stewart, The Federal "Door-Closing" Doctrine, 11 XAsu. & LEE L. REv. 154 (1954).
15. Similarly, a creditor can invoke transient jurisdiction in a foreign forum to garnish
debts owed to his debtor, Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), and may thus be able to
take advantage of a lenient statute of limitations in the state where he "catches" his debtor's
debtor. Cf. Holt, The Federal Interpleader Act and Conflict of Laws in Garnishment, 4
U. CHi. L. REV. 403, 421-29 (1937) ; note 149 infra. On the implications for this problem
of transfer of venue according to the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952), see
Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 405 (1955).
16. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209, 214 (1922). See Ehrenzweig,
American Conflicts Law in its Historical Perspective, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 133, 147-50
(1954).
17. See REsTATEmENT, CONFLIcr OF LAws §§ 59-70 (1934).
18. See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Co., 348 U.S. 66, 70-73 (1954). See,
generally, Ehrenzweig, supra note 16, at 150. For a contrary view of the choice-of-law
implications of the Watson case, see Note, 64 YALE L.J. 940, 948 (1955).
19. In the light of Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Co., supra note 18, at 73,
First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952), which held that Illinois could
not, under the full faith and credit clause, refuse to entertain a wrongful death action
brought under a Utah statute, may have to be limited to a case in which "all elements"
of the cause of action, id. at 400, occurred in the foreign state. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive
Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953), may also indicate a weakening of the full faith and credit ap-
proach of the Court (statutes of limitation), as may the continuing retreat in workmen's
compensation cases. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955). See Ehrenzweig, supra note
16, at 153; and, generally, Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U.
Cm. L. REV. 775, 786, 790 (1955) ; The Supreme Court, 1954 Tern, 69 HARv. L. REv. 119,
133-34.
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the Supreme Court with its limited private law jurisdiction will never be able
to engage in that meticulous process of analogizing and distinguishing a myriad
of cases, which alone can satisfy the needs of an ever-changing and multifarious
law of choice-of-law. But does this mean that American conflicts law is to be
left forever to the "local" whim of the forum, with its all-purpose tools of
"procedure," "remedy," "public policy" and "proper law" ?20 The answer cannot
lie in the construction of new "logical" formulas for choice-of-law, but must
await the result of patient groping from case to case. Meanwhile a reform of
the law of jurisdiction may help to minimize the problem by limiting the
choice of the forum on rational grounds to one having such contacts with the
case as will justify the application of the chosen forum's own law.
Notwithstanding the obvious shortcomings and the virtually unanimous
criticism of the law of personal jurisdiction, efforts for judicial or legislative
reform have been decisively impeded by the assumption, so forcefully sup-
ported by the author of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,21 that our rules
of personal jurisdiction are of ancient common law origin. I shall try to show
that they are not, and that, until the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
notwithstanding dogmatic generalizations later sanctioned by the Restate-
ment,22 appellate courts hardly ever in fact held transient service sufficient as
such. Indeed, courts apparently had occasion only rarely to proceed upon such
service, since state statutes, as yet unrestricted by constitutional demand, quite
liberally permitted suits against absent defendants, leaving it to the courts to
determine whether they properly had jurisdiction in a given case. Forum con-
veniens-to use an unusual, but I believe helpful, phrase-was, in this sense,
the basis of all personal jurisdiction.
I shall try to show further that all this did not change fundamentally until
1877, when the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff 23 held unconstitutional
all statutes basing in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants on
less than personal service within the state. Only when transient service, hither-
to a harmless adjunct of convenient jurisdiction, thus came to be required for
the establishment of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, did
such service also become generally sufficient for this purpose. And if the
plaintiff was thus to be compensated by the new transient rule for some of the
inconvenience caused to him by the Pennoyer requirement, the doctrine of the
inconvenient forum was in turn resorted to in order to give the defendant
protection against some of the hardship this rule caused him. The common
law and common sense jurisdiction of the forum conveniens yielded to a dog-
matic rule of personal service precariously balanced by a doctrine of forum
non conveniens.
20. As to the uncertainty left by the "local law" theory of choice-of-law, see Cheat-
ham, Anerican Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARv. L. REv.
361, 386 (1945); Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 Amx. J.
Comp. L. 297, 312 (1953) ; Ehrenzweig, supra note 16, at 153.
21. See text at note 45 infra.
22. See text at note 1 supra.
23. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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The concepts of "physical power" and "transitory action" which are com-
monly invoked to justify this structure can, I believe, be shown to be results
of an unsuccessful endeavor to give the appearance of rationality to an irration-
al rule. They are based on a historical misunderstanding which appears to
have been caused or perpetuated by a lack of insight into the significance of
contemporary events or intervening changes in the functioning of legal rules.
In spite of the rationalizations of the rule, however, the rule itself appears to
be changing and, reversing the process of its development, returning to an
earlier and better form. The present paper is intended to help promote the
change by a historical and functional analysis of the law of personal jurisdic-
tion, its myth, its true basis and its needs for the future.
THE MviYTH: A C OMMON LAW OF "PHYSICAL POWER"
Beal's "Unchangeable" Common Law
In view of the apparently unanimous acceptance of a general transient rule
today, it is somewhat surprising at first glance to find that both courts and
writers stating it are satisfied either with the citation of doubtful, or with the
absence of any, authority.
2 4
Professor Beale in his treatise adduces nineteen cases.2 5 Four of these con-
cern corporations, 26 and for this if for no other reason fail to bear out a rule
applicable to individual transients.27 Another case also fails to support the
rule because the defendant had been found to be a resident and temporary
domiciliary of the state of the forum ;28 and three cases likewise fail because
"the defendant appeared in the action and answered to the merits and was
24. LEFLAR, ARKANSAS LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 100 (1938) (two cases from 1872
and 1895) ; STJM BERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 72 (2d ed. 1951) (see text at notes 43-44 infra) ;
Burdick, Service as a Requirement of Due Process in Actions in Personaln, 20 MIcH. L.
REv. 422, 425 (1922) (one unrelated passage from Blackstone) ; Dodd, supra note 7, at 438
(no authority). ALI, CO~TENTARIES ON CONFLIcr OF LAWS, RESTATEIAENT No. 2, at 10
(1926) finds "little authority on this proposition."
25. 1 BEALE, CONFLICr OF LAWS 339 n.6, 340 nn.1, 2 (1935).
26. Case v. Smith, Lineaweaver & Co., 152 Fed. 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1907); Reeves v.
Southern Ry., 121 Ga. 561, 49 S.E. 674 (1904) ; Johnston v. Trade Ins. Co., 132 Mass.
432 (1882) ; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Lawrence, 74 Miss. 782, 22 So. 53 (1897). The
federal case cited not only concerned a corporate defendant, but the court, in upholding
service on a corporate officer on the basis of his mere presence within the state, stressed
the fact that he had come to a jurisdiction "in which the cause of action was located."
Case v. Smith, Lineaweaver & Co., supra, at 732.
27. The history of the law of personal jurisdiction over corporations started with
the original denial and then gradual admission of their extraterritorial "existence." See
the line of cases from Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518, 636 (1819) ; through Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) ; International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) ; to International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ; Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). Both
the older requirement of "presence" and the current one of "fair play" relate to "minimum
contacts" that are absent in the transient rule as applicable to individuals.
28. Alley v. Caspari, 80 Me. 234, 14 Atl. 12 (1888).
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personally present on the trial," and thus "submitted himself in all respects to
the jurisdiction of the court in that action. '29 In the ninth case the suit was
against a nonresident alien 3 0 --and so there was an especially good reason for
entertaining a transitory action.31 In four cases transient jurisdiction may
have been supported by such other factors as defendant's membership in a firm
doing business in the forum state,32 a domestic cause of action,33 or "some
part of the transaction [taking] . . . place within the state."34 Three cases do
not seem to be in point,3 5 though another comes close: the court refused to
enjoin prosecution by a local plaintiff of a local suit against a local defendant
in a neighboring forum.36 When the grain has been winnowed from the chaff,
there are only two cases holding squarely to the transient rule, neither de-
cided earlier than 1870. In Peabody v. Hanzilton,37 there was true transient
jurisdiction of a defendant who was a citizen of another state, in a suit by an
alien. And the court stated that "personal actions, of a transitory nature, may
be maintained in any jurisdiction within which the defendant is found so that
process is legally served upon him." s38 But Peabody v. Hamilton goes beyond
the authority of the only pertinent case it relies upon-where the suit was
against a nonresident alien.3 9 The second case applying the transient rule was
29. Reed v. Hollister, 106 Ore. 407, 413, 212 Pac. 367, 369 (1923) (semnble) ; State
ex rel. Mackey v. District Court, 40 Mont. 359, 106 Pac. 1098 (1910) (special appearance
first, then request for leave to answer on the merits, held to constitute a general appear-
ance) ; Bowman v. Flint, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 28, 82 S.W. 1049 (1870) (defendant also was
doing business in state, and cause of action arose there).
30. Belden v. Wilkinson, 44 App. Div. 420, 60 N.Y. Supp. 1083 (1st Dep't 1899).
31. See text at notes 106-07 infra.
32. Mason v. Connors, 129 Fed. 831 (C.C.D. Vt. 1904). In addition the defendant
himself was in the state on "voluntary private business," and the suit apparently arose out
of the very business the defendant was engaged in. See also Bowman v. Flint, 37 Tex. Civ.
App. 28,82 S.W. 1049 (1870).
33. Darrah v. Watson, 36 Iowa 116 (1873). While the facts of the case do not con-
tain a statement to this effect, its correctness may be inferred from the fact that the only
authority relied on by the court is Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. *462 (1813), where the
theory of the decision upholding personal service upon a transient was in terms limited to
cases where the defendant had contracted a debt or committed a tort in the state of the
forum and thus owed "temporary allegiance" to the state. In addition defendant had
"appeared to the writ and defended the action." Id. at *470.
34. Wertheim v. Clerque, 53 App. Div. 122, 126, 65 N.Y. Supp. 750, 753 (1st Dep't
1900) ; Rice v. Brown, 81 Me. 56, 16 Atl. 334 (1888) (lease, apparently of forum land).
35. Molina v. Comisi6n Reguladora, 92 N.J.L. 38, 104 At. 450 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (quasi
in rem) ; Miller v. Black, 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 342 (1855) (plea in abatement not good be-
cause of failure to allege that cause of action not local) ; Rafael v. Verelst, 2 Wm. Bl.
1055, 96 Eng. Rep. 621 (K.B. 1776) (English defendant in English court; apparently no
objection to jurisdiction over him, but only to jurisdiction of subject matter and of alien
plaintiff's suit).
36. McDaniel v. Alford, 148 Ga. 609, 97 S.E. 673 (1918).
37. 106 Mass. 217 (1870).
38. Id. at 220.
39. Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354, 358 (1819). See text at notes 31 supra, 106-07
infra. The following cases also cited in Peabody v. Hamilton concerned the different
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Lee v. Baird.40 It follows two earlier cases, 41 which in turn rely on Peabody
v. Hamilton.
Professor Beale adds no further pertinent authority in an article specially
devoted to this topic. 42 Judge Goodrich and Professor Stumberg in their texts
add one case which, however, concerned a nonresident alien defendant 43 and
is therefore as inconclusive as the cases it relies on.
44
It is evident that although the transient rule has often been mouthed by the
courts it has but rarely been applied. In the light of this state of authority
and of the functional inadequacy of the transient rule, it is hard to agree with
Professor Beale's statement that the rule is so deeply entrenched as to make it,
question, see text at note 23 supra, whether personal service within the state in cases other
than those based on attachment or the defendant's domicile, was required (rather than
sufficient) ; Carleton v. Bickford, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 591 (1859) ; Ewer v. Coffin, 55
Mass. (1 Cush.) 23 (1848) ; Wright v. Oakley, 46 Mass. (5 Met.) 400 (1843) ; Gleason
v. Dodd, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 333 (1842) ; Hall v. Williams, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 232 (1828).
Also cited was Barringer v. King, 71. Mass. (5 Gray) 9 (1855), which concerned the
validity of a New York judgment against a Massachusetts resident transiently served in
New York. The plaintiff was apparently a New York resident, however, and the issue
was whether defendant had appeared or been served, not whether transient service was
sufficient.
40. 139 Ala. 526, 36 So. 720 (1903). A full-blown transient rule was applied to acquire
personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant at the behest of an out-of-state plain-
tiff, on an out-of-state cause of action.
41. Steen v. Swadley, 126 Ala. 616, 28 So. 620 (1900) ; Smith v. Gibson, 83 Ala. 284,
3 So. 321 (1888).
42. Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts Over Foreigners, 26 HARv. L. REv. 193, 283
(1912), mentions, in addition to cases in notes 26-40 supra, the following: Badger v. Towle,
48 Me. 20 (1860) (exceptions sustained against dismissal, it not having appeared "that the
plaintiff was not an inhabitant of, and resident within the State at the time the action was
commenced," id. at 21) ; Thompson v. Cowell, 148 Mass. 552, 20 N.E. 170 (1889) (suit
concerning title to real estate in the forum state) ; McDonald v. MacArthur Bros. Co., 154
N.C. 122, 69 S.E. 832 (1910) (corporate defendant).
Two other early cases, not mentioned by Beale, that applied the transient rule are
Latourette v. Clarke, 45 Barb. 327 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1st Dist. 1865) (see text at notes 114-15
infra and note 116 infra) ; Mlussina v. Belden, 6 Abb. Pr. 165 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1st Dist.
1858) (semble).
43. Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 92, 34 Atl. 714, 715 (1895) ; cited
in GoODRICH, CoNFucr OF LAWs 189 (3d ed. 1949) and STUMBERG, CoNFLIcT OF LAws
72n.21 (2d ed. 1951).
44. Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147 (1872) (alien's right to recover
proceeds of goods seized in rebellion) ; O'Sullivan v. Overton, 56 Conn. 102 (1888) (in
rem service binds only the property and not the person) ; Easterly v. Goodwin, 35 Conn.
273 (1868) (same) ; Duryee v. Hale, 31 Conn. 217 (1862) (no personal service) ; Bishop
v. Vose, 27 Conn. 1 (1858) (domestic plaintiff) ; Hatch v. Spofford, 22 Conn. *485 (1853)
(domestic plaintiff, and contract cause of action having contact with forum state) ; Wood
v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500 (1846) (refusal to enforce a New York judgment against a
defendant not personally served in New York) ; Hart v. Granger, 1 Conn. *154 (1814)
(domestic plaintiffs) ; Place v. Lyon, Kirby 404 (Conn. 1788) (conceding a remedy against
vexatious suits) ; Potter v. Allin, 2 Root 63 (Conn. 1793) (suit against nonresident alien).
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Most expressions of the general transient rule are buttressed by little more
than a reference to Justice Holmes' much-quoted statement that the "founda-
tion of jurisdiction is physical power." 6 This statement is both factually un-
supported and functionally unsupportable under modern conditions.47 If it
should appear that it not only is incorrect today but has never been correct,
either in this country or in England, we should have to discard it as just an-
other one of the great jurist's unfortunate aphorisms in the field of conflict of
laws.48 In so doing, we should find support in an English commentator's con-
clusions that Holmes' aphorism was only a manifestation of "that courageous
cynicism which made the young century feel so grown-up," and that the power
myth originated in Dicey's famous red herring, the "principle of effectiveness,"
rather than in ancient wisdom.
49
Early judicial procedure depended upon voluntary subjection of both parties
to the court's judgment. The Roman litiscontestatio, the medieval trial by
ordeal, battle and feud,59 as well as jurisdictional agreements in (primitive)
modern international law,51 point to the universality of the consent technique.
Later developments permitted the courts to obtain consent by inducement and
force,52 but apparently only a comparatively recent growth of the state's gen-
eral functions has enabled administration of justice to proceed by self-asserted
authority. Lack of self-reliance thus seems to have been the original source of
45. 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 275 (1935). See also I id. at 339-67; and in general
Rheinstein, supra note 19, at 791-96. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS *353, "413
derived similar conclusions, prior to Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), from the "law
of the land."
46. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1915). See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 73 (3d ed. 1949).
47. See Dodd, Jitrisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 ILL. L. REV. 427, 428, 434, 435
(1929), finding support for his opposition to the power theory in the existence of declara-
tory judgments, continuing jurisdiction and jurisdiction by consent. Among many other
instances in which jurisdiction is independent of physical power, one particularly worthy
of mention is the spreading acceptance of mailing as a proper method of personal service.
See, e.g., Durfee v. Durfee, 293 Mass. 472, 200 N.E. 395 (1936).
48. See Ehrenzweig, American Conflicts Law in Its Historical Perspective, 103 U.
PA. L. REv. 133,147 (1954).
49. Smith, Personal Jurisdiction, 2 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 510, 522 (1953); cf. DICEY,
CoNFLcT OF LAws 22, 24 (6th ed., Morris 1949).
50. See Salic Law (496 A.D.) tits. 1, 56, reprinted in HENDERSON, SELECT HISTORICAL
DOCUMENTS OF THE MIDDLE AGES 176, 187 (1896); Thayer, The Older Modes of Trial,
5 HARv. L. REv. 45,65 (1891).
51. See, e.g., the STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusTlcE art. 36, re-
printed in BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 704, 708 (1953).
52. See, generally, WENGER, INSTITUTES OF THE ROMAN LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
33-42 (Fisk trans. 1940).
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the law's lasting insistence on at least symbolical submission to the court's
jurisdiction.
The conclusion that such psychological, rather than Justice Holmes' phy-
sical power, was the foundation of the early judge's jurisdiction, is supported
on the one hand by the fact that once submission has been obtained the law
has always been satisfied with less than actual power,53 and on the other hand
by the law's continuing desire for the defendant's "co-operation"--expressed,
for instance, in its hesitation in admitting judgments by default.54 The juris-
dictional rationale thus suggested is equivalent to that English theory which
attributes all personal jurisdiction past and present to a theory of express or
implied "submission."' 5
The power doctrine might be justified theoretically as offering the defendant
some protection against a vindictive plaintiff's unfair choice of forum, for it
would limit the scope of the plaintiff's choice to the court of the defendant's
voluntary presence. But until recent times the defendant never needed such
protection. When migration and progressing commercialization tended to
separate the parties from the place where the cause of action arose, the laws of
all countries endeavored to protect the defendant by requiring the plaintiff to
"lay the venue" at a place connected with the case. Thus it was provided in
Justinian's Code that the plaintiff was to follow the defendant to the place
where the defendant was domiciled either at the time of the suit or when he
executed the contract sued upon.56 And later exceptions to this provision re-
mained related to the places of performance, wrong and property situs. 57 But
what later became known as the civilian doctrine of actio sequitur forum rei 58
(the action follows the defendant's court) referred to the defendant's domicile
or residence, and not to the place where he was temporarily to be found-and
so was far from expressing a power rationale of jurisdiction.5 9
English legal history furnishes little support for the power doctrine. Even
when the King's Bench, in competition with the Common Pleas, began to base
its personal jurisdiction upon the physical arrest of the defendant, actual phy-
sical power over the defendant was not invariably required.60 Of course, in
53. See Holmes, J., in Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 353 (1913) ; note
141 infra.
54. Cf. MILLAR, CIVIL PROcEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
361-73 (1952). A similar desire for the defendant's acquiescence is perhaps expressed in
the law's compunctions concerning criminal convictions without confessions. See, general-
ly, Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 855, 867 (1953).
55. Smith, supra note 49, at 522.
56. CODE OF JUSTINIAN 3.13.2. See WENGER, op. cit. supra note 52, at 46.
57. WENGER, op. cit. supra note 52, at 47.
58. "Actor rei forum, sive in ren, sive in personam sit actio, sequitur. CODE OF
JUSTINIAN 3.19.3. The modern use of this phrase in England and the United States does
not correspond to its original meaning. See, e.g., CHIESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 102 (4th ed. 1952).
59. See MOREL, TRAITL tL1MENTAIRE DE PROC9DURE CIVILE 292-94 (1932).
60. Constructive custody of a defendant could be acquired by the King's Bench by a
mere record of the defendant's bail on the rolls, 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *287, and
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England there was nothing comparable to the competing, geographically limited
jurisdictions of the United States; and the courts with their nationwide juris-
diction might have been said to have at least potential power over all subjects
within the realm. But even so, personal jurisdiction, in the words of an Eng-
lish jurist, is thought of as ordinarily depending "on the allegiance of the party
or his consent" 6' rather than the court's physical power over him.
The English case most often referred to in support of the transient rule, on
both sides of the Atlantic, is Buchanan v. Rucker.62 Here Lord Ellenborough
denied recognition to a default judgment of the Island Court of Tobago over
an English subject, because he had not been "subject" to the jurisdiction of
the Tobago court "at the time of commencing the suit
' 63 even though served
by publication in accordance with local law. This case is usually cited for the
twin propositions that personal service within the state of the rendering court
is both required and sufficient for giving that court jurisdiction. But it is
certainly anything but clear that Lord Ellenborough would have found "juris-
diction" had Rucker been served in Tobago as a transient on a pleasure trip.
The court might well have required some prior contact of the defendant with
the island, as indeed the Tobago statute itself seems to have done, being in
terms applicable only or primarily to owners of local plantations.
4 In the very
case that is generally regarded as having established the triability in England
of foreign causes of action, Lord Mansfield expressly reserved opinion on
whether a suit upon a foreign tort against a person "happening casually to be
here," "might perhaps be triable only where both parties at the time were
subjects."65 The first English case that can be claimed to have held transient
service sufficient to convey "international jurisdiction" was decided in 1895,
long after Pennoyer v. Neff, and in that case the defendant had not only ap-
peared but counterclaimed. 66
this in turn was obtainable without the cooperation of the defendant by the use of an elabo-
rate fiction. See 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 219-20 (1922).
61. Wright, J., in Turnbull v. Walker, 67 L.T.R. 767, 769 (Q.B. 1892). Allegiance
rather than power also seems to have been stressed in such early American cases as
Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. *462 (1813); Shumway v. Stillman, 4 Cow. 292, 296 (N.Y.
1825).
62. 9 East 192, 103 Eng. Rep. 546 (K.B. 1808).
63. Id. at 194, 103 Eng. Rep. at 547.
64. The Tobago statute that Lord Ellenborough assumed to be applicable only to
"persons who have been present and within the jurisdiction," seemed to take for granted
that service would be sought upon defendants maintaining a "plantation in the island." See
Douglas v. Forrest, 4 Bing. 686 (C.P. 1928), distinguishing Buchanan v. Rucker on the
ground that in that case defendant had never been in or owned property in Tobago; Berry
v. Shead, [1886] 7 N.S.W.L.R. 39, 54 (Austr.) ("[I]f... the defendant had been resident
in the island when he incurred the obligation he would have been bound by the proceed-
ings....").
65. Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 176, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1030 (K.B. 1774). See
also Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134, 137 (N.Y. 1817), relying on Lord Mansfield's
distinction in holding the assumption of jurisdiction over a tort committed on the high
seas to be a matter of discretion. The latter case is discussed in text at notes 118-23 infra.
66. Carrick v. Hancock, 12 T.L.R. 59 (Q.B. 1895).
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If physical power does not appear to have been alone sufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction in English law, neither does it seem to have been required
for the purpose. All that can be found in earlier cases is a dictum by Baron
Parke in 1834, suggesting that a French judgment might have been entitled
to recognition in England if at least the defendant's "temporary presence" in
France had been alleged. The question of proper service was not in issue.
67
And in a series of later cases from 1849 to 1889 English courts found nothing
contrary to "natural justice" in foreign judgments based on less than local
personal service, as where the defendant had expressly or impliedly consented
to substituted service or personal service abroad. 68
In the English courts themselves there was little occasion for the exercise of
a purely transient jurisdiction until, around the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, they began generally to adjudicate foreign causes of action. And then
a domestic plaintiff was hardly tempted to lie in wait for his foreign debtor,
since as early as 1781 "the practitioners were clear as to the regularity of
personal service outside England." 69 If doubt in this respect should have crept
in at any time during the first quarter of the century,70 it was soon removed
when courts were authorized by statute to acquire jurisdiction over persons
outside the realm by service abroad in cases involving sufficient contacts."1
67. General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou, [1843] 11 M. & W. 876, 894, 152 Eng.
Rep. 1061, 1068 (Ex.).
68. Vallee v. Dumergue, [1849] 4 Ex. 290, 303, 154 Eng. Rep. 1221, 1227 (prior
agreement of shareholder to accept service at a French corporate domicile); Copin v.
Adamson, [1875] 1 Ex. D. 17 (same). See also Tharsis Sulphur and Copper Co. v. Soci~t6
des Metaux, 58 L.J.Q.B. (n.s.) 435 (1889) (defendant's contractual agreement to accept
service on London agent).
Early English cases went so far as to hold that the defendant impliedly consented to
substituted service or in personam service abroad whenever by his actions he led the local
plaintiff to believe that if any dispute arose local redress would be available. See Berry
v. Shead, [1886] 7 N.S.W.L.R. 39 (Austr.) ; Schibsby v. Westenholz, [1870] L.R. 6 Q.B.
155, 161.; Anderson v. Hodgson, [1747] 6 Mor. 4779 (Court of Session). However, later
English cases seem to evince a change in attitude. Cf. Emanuel v. Lyman, [1908] 1 K.B.
302 (C.A. 1907) (refusal to recognize a foreign judgment based on service abroad, even
though defendant was a partner in an enterprise in the foreign state). Whether this
change is at least partly attributable to American influence is not clear.
69. Bourke v. Lord MacDonald, 2 Dick. 587, 21 Eng. Rep. 399 (Ch. 1781.). It was
not necessary for this case to decide that personal service abroad was sufficient as the
plaintiff had later served the defendant personally in England. The Bourke case was cited
in Scott v. Hough, [1820] 4 Bro. C.C. 213, to the effect that the chancellor "thought the
service of the subpoena abroad a good service." Smith, supra note 49, at 525, states that
the Bourke case was misquoted in Scott v. Hough, but the Scott interpretation is strongly
supported by Nichol v. Gwyn, [1827] 1 Sim. 389 (Ch.).
70. Cf. Anon., 27 LEGA. OBSERWER 387 (1844), where the writer complains, prior to
the Act of 1852, see note 71 infra, of the number of Englishmen abroad escaping English
jurisdiction. The only case refusing an English attachment based on service of process out-
side England seems to be Fernandez v. Corbin, [1829] 2 Sim. 544 (Ch.). For an exhaustive
judicial review of the case history, see Drummond v. Drummond, [1866] L.R. 2 Ch. 32.
71. In an Act of 23 May 1832, 2 & 3 W.TL. 4, c. 33, [1832] Picx. STAT. 99, service
of chancery subpoenas within other parts of the United Kingdom was declared permissible
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And where service was made locally, English courts have always felt free to
protect a foreign defendant against "oppression and injustice" by refusing to
assert a mere transient jurisdiction.7
2
It seems that a "power" rationale, having neither functional nor historical
justification, will be of little help in our search for a basis of the transient
rule; we must look elsewhere.
The "Transitory Action"
In England and in the United States, sufficiency of personal service within
the country is limited to and largely identified with the concept of "transitory
actions" which may be brought wherever the defendant is found. Yet this term.
though in use for other purposes as early as the sixteenth century,73 has only
very recently assumed its present significance.
Most if not all references to transitory actions in texts 74 and cases 7 ulti-
mately go back to Blackstone's Commentaries, where we learn that in actions
"for injuries that might have happened anywhere, as debt, detinue, slander
and the like, the plaintiff may declare in what county he pleases, and then the
trial must be in that county in which the declaration is laid."'7' It is the early
rules of venue that have been used as the doubtful source of our law of transi-
tory actions in interstate and international conflicts cases.
77
Originally in English law all actions were local in the sense that they had
in suits concerning English land; an Act of 15 Aug. 1834, 4 & 5 WILL. 4, C. 82, [18341
PICK. STAT. 356, added suits concerning land liens; and a further extension was enacted
under 8 & 9 VIcT., c. 105 (1845) in Gen. Order 33. Common law courts received the same
;powers by the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, 15 & 16 VicT., c. 76, now Order XI,
Rules 1 and 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, THE ANNUAL PRACTICE 93-117 (1954),
under the authority of The Judicature Act, 1875, 38 & 39 VICT. c. 77. For an evaluation
of the legislative history, see Drummond v. Drummond, [1866] L.R. 2 Ch. 32. See, gen-
erally, CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 110 (4th ed. 1952) ; GRAVESoN, CONFLICT
OF LAws 272 (2d ed. 1952) ; and concerning other member nations of the Commonwealth,
Committee on Foreign Law, American Judgnwnts Abroad, 9 REcoRD 391-99 (1954).
72. See, e.g., In re Norton's Settlement, 1 Ch. 471 (1908) ; Egbert v. Short, 2 Ch.
205, 210 (1907) ; Logan v. Bank of Scotland, I K.B. 141 (1906).
73. Cf. Queen v. Vaux, 1 Leon. 37, 38, 74 Eng. Rep. 35, 36 (Ex. 1586) (declaring the
venue non-traversable upon a bill of intrusion because the property alleged to have been
taken was "things transitory, and also the taking of them") ; Collins v. Sutton, 1 Lev. 149,
83 Eng. Rep. 342, 343 (K.B. 1665) (upholding a demurrer to defendant's plea to the juris-
diction where "transitory matters" involved) ; Anon., 11 Mod. Rep. 51, 52, 88 Eng. Rep.
878 (Q.B. 1706) (declaring transitory an action on a bond).
74. See, e.g., BOOTE, AN HISTORICAL TREATISE OF AN ACTION OR SUIT AT LAW 97
(4th ed. 1805) ; 1 PAINE & DuER, NEW YORK PRACTICE 88 (1830).
75. See, e.g., Genin v. Grier, 10 Ohio 209 (1840). In the 1773 Connecticut case of
Stretter (or Streeter), Superior Court Diary of William Samuel Johnson, 1772-1773, 4
Am. LEG. REC. 124 (1942), a desertion in Massachusetts was held suable in Connecticut,
being "transitory" under the divorce statute of that state.
76. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMIENTAIUES *294.
77. See Foster, Place of Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Ad-
justment, 44 HARv. L. REv. 41, 48 (1930) ; and, generally, Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 1219 (1953).
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to be brought at a place closely connected with the cause of action, "because
the Jury was to come from where the fact was committed. 7 8 While as to land
this venue has remained at the situs,79 "transitory" actions concerning chattels
were "to follow the defendant wherever he could be found."80 But even here
the plaintiff was "supposed to lay it where the Action accrued," and only "in
case the defendant fled from that place, the plaintiff had liberty to try his
Action in the County wherein the defendant was sunmnzoned."8' The subse-
quent history is characterized by judicial and legislative endeavors to find an
equitable balance that would protect both the plaintiff against elusive defen-
dants and the defendant against the whim of vindictive plaintiffs. Thus, a
growing practice of permitting the plaintiff to sue at places other than that of
the cause of action s 2 was counteracted by a statute of 1382 which compelled
the plaintiff to commence writs of account and debt in the county where the
contract had been made.8 3 And when at the end of the sixteenth century the
Court of Exchequer held that violation of venue requirements was non-tra-
versable,8 4 some of the inferior courts continued to enforce the old strict venue
rule.8 r Similarly, a statute of 1665 which limited stays and reversals of jury
verdicts on grounds of lack of venue 86 was, at least for some time, interpreted
as preserving the venue requirement by speaking of the "proper county.
'8 7
And when the statutory venue requirement came to be largely neglected in a
judicial practice generally satisfied with some element of the cause of action
having occurred in the forum,88 courts began to stress their power to change
the venue when the plaintiff chose a venue contrary to the statute.80 Finally,
when in 1705 a statute in effect permitted the plaintiff to lay his transitory
actions in any county,90 courts began to grant motions for such changes of
venue to the place of the cause of action as "motions of course."' 1 Additional
78. Boom, op. cit. supra note 74, at 97. See also Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the His-
tory of the English Law, in 3 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835-1935, at 342, 357
(1937) ; Wicker, The Development of the Distinction between Local and Transitory Ac-
tions, 4 TENN. L. REv. 55, 61 (1926).
79. See, generally, Blume, Place of Trial of Civil Cases, 48 MicH. L. REv. 1, 9 (1949).
80. BooTE, op. cit. supra note 74, at 97.
81. Ibid.
82. See the historical account in Bulwer's Case, 7 Co. Rep. la, 3b, 77 Eng. Rep. 411,
415 (K.B. 1586). The rationale used was that debts and contracts were "nulliuts loci."
83. 6RIca.2,c.2 (1382).
84. Queen v. Vaux, 1 Leon. 37, 74 Eng. Rep. 35 (Ex. 1586). See, generally, Sack,
supra note 78, at 425 n.188.
85. See Sack, supra note 78, at 367,426 n.189.
86. 16 & 17 CAR. 2, c. 8, § 1 (1665) ; 22 & 23 CAR. 2, c. 4 (1670).
87. Bailiffs of Litchfield v. Slater, Willes 431, 432, 435-36, 125 Eng. Rep. 1253, 1255-56
(C.P. 1743). See, generally, Sack, supra note 78, at 367.
88. See BooE, op. cit. supra note 74, at 98; Sack, supra note 78, at 428 n.197.
89. See Sack, supra note 78, at 368.
90. 4 & 5 ANN, c. 16, § 6 (1705).
91. BooTE, op. cit. supra note 74, at 154. Cf. TiDD, Fo.ums OF PRACTICAL PROCEEDINGS
IN THE COURTS OF KING'S BENCH, COMMON PLEAS, AND EXCHEQUER OF PLEAS 253 (5th
ed. 1819) ; Holmes v. Wainwright, 3 East 329, 330, 102 Eng. Rep. 624 (K.B. 1803).
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limitations on the plaintiff's choice were imposed by statutes and city liberties
prohibiting plaintiffs to sue their compatriots outside their jurisdiction.
2
All through these procedural vagaries, transitory actions thus remained
essentially local,93 and in principle tied to the cause of action rather than fol-
lowing the defendant wherever he was found. In other words, the law's solici-
tude for the defendant prevented the development of a rigid "power" rule bas-
ing jurisdiction over the defendant on the fortuity of his location, and favored
instead a rule of forum conveniens.
The same results have obtained in England in cases involving foreign causes
of action ever since English courts began to adjudicate such cases. True, when
foreign causes of action became triable in England this triability applied from
the start to transitory actions, as to which it was permissible to lay a fictitious
venue in England. 94 But an analysis of the case law shows that those cases
in which English courts in fact assumed jurisdiction had substantial domestic
contacts or else were such that plaintiff could not expect justice elsewhere.9"
In the typical case, suit would be brought against a colonial officer of the
Crown, as to whom both these tests would apply. 90 And where jurisdiction
was assumed over a mere transient, an English court would exercise its dis-
cretion in protecting him against harassment.
97
In view of the virtual lack of case law 98 recognizing jurisdiction based on
mere presence, the unanimous opposition of English writers on the subject to
transient jurisdiction 09 probably represents the law in England today. Scot-
tish doctrine has always insisted that something more is needed for personal
jurisdiction than "mere transient presence,"' 00 and in Canada a suggestion to
introduce the transient rule was rejected because the possibility of occasional
hardship to the plaintiff would not justify the impairment of the defendant's
"right to defend on the merits at his own place of residence."'u 0
92. See JACOB, CI'y-LIBERTIES 147 (1732).
93. Kuhn, Local and Transitory Actions in Private International Law, 66 U. PA. L.
REV. 301 (1.918).
94. See Sack, supra note 78, at 370.
95. Id. at 352. See, generally, Graveson, Choice of Law and Choice of Jurisdiction in
the English Conflict of Laws, 28 BaIT. YB. INT'L L. 273 (1951).
96. See, e.g., Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 171-72, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1027 (K.B.
1744) ; Lord Bellamont's Case, 2 Salk. 625, 91 Eng. Rep. 529 (K.B. 1700) ; cf. Rafael v.
Verelst, 2 Win. B. 983, 96 Eng. Rep. 579 (K.B. 1774).
97. See note 72 supra.
98. But cf. Carrick v. Hancock, [1895] 12 T.L.R. 59 (Q.B.), discounted by READ,
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 149 (1938), as a decision of a
single judge and the only direct English authority. One might add that in that case defen-
dant actually appeared, through counsel, and defended on the merits.
99. CHESHIRE, op. cit. supra note 71, at 601; READ, op. cit. supra note 98, at 150;
WESTLAKE, PIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 101-02 (1858). See also Note, 48 COLUM. L.
REV. 605 (1948).
100. GIBB, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JURISDICTION IN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND 42
(1926). See also id. at 59 as to the requirement of personal service.
101. Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity
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The American transient rule must, in sum, be said to lack precedent in the
English tradition of the common law as to both of its alleged sources-the
doctrine of physical power and the concept of the transitory action. It remains
to be seen whether, and if so in what manner, American case law itself sup-
ports the rule.
THE FACT: A RELIC OF PENNOYER V. NEFF
Early common and statute law
Early American courts and legislatures were apparently little concerned with
the problems whether, and if so when, a non-citizen could be subjected to
domestic jurisdiction: there were no early decisions or legislative answers to
the question whether suits against foreigners were governed by such statutory
venue requirements as that of the Bodie of Liberties of Massachusetts '02_-
under which, with certain exceptions, all actions were to be "tryed within that
jurisdiction where the cause of the Action doth arise."'10 3 *
In those cases in which early American courts chose to subject foreign
visitors to their jurisdiction upon foreign causes of action, they did so with-
out resorting to fictions and subtle conceptual classifications so obnoxious to
their general approach to making and applying law.10 4 But on the other hand,
there is no indication in the available case law 105 that these courts were will-
ing or anxious to exercise "physical power" in "transitory actions" against a
nonresident on a foreign cause of action where the plaintiff was not a citizen
of the forum state and so was not entitled to special consideration.
Most of the decisions that have been cited for an early transient rule con-
cern suits against aliens. In such cases jurisdiction would be assumed on the
ground that "if the creditor cannot take him here, he may lose his chance of
securing the debt";106 and perhaps this was a prerequisite to the courts' as-
sumption of jurisdiction. 0 7 This rationale was (and still is) particularly per-
tinent in admiralty, where relegation of the plaintiff to a foreign forum might
of Legislation in Canada (1933), 18 PRor CAN. B. Ass'N, 225, 307 (1934). See note 107
infra.
102. The Book of the General Lavues and Libertyes concerning &c, Actions § 1
(1642), reprinted in THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1 (1929).
103. But cf. 2 MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 223, § 1 (1932), which in substance has been the
law since 1784. Guild v. Bonnemort, 156 Mass. 522, 31. N.E. 645 (1892).
104. See MORRIS, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 46, 48, 56 (1930).
105. All research in this field, as to both legal history and current case law, is neces-
sarily incomplete in view of the impossibility of ascertaining the practice of trial courts.
106. Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354, *358 (1819). Even in such cases earlier judi-
cial practice, following international usage, may have limited jurisdiction over the defen-
dant "to matters relating to his acts and conduct while within that territory." Hammersley,
J., dissenting in Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 142, 34 At. 714, 729 (1895),
relying on 2 PHILIMORE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 4 (3d ed. 1882), and STORY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 613 (1st ed. 1834).
107. See Ra v. Hayden, 3 Mass. 24, 25 (1807), limiting the plea to the jurisdiction to
those cases in which "some [other] court of the nation has jurisdiction of the cause of
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easily have meant complete loss of remedy.'03 The same reasoning apparently
supported the assumption of jurisdiction over citizens of sister states for the
benefit of resident plaintiffs whose interest in speedy justice would be deemed
to outweigh the transient defendant's preference for his own forum.10 9
In almost all other cases in which jurisdiction was purportedly based on
transient service, the forum in fact had contacts with either the case or a party,
as where the cause of action had arisen within the state and was thus subject
to domestic law,"0 or where the defendant had himself sought the assistance
of the court.:" As late as 1874 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared
it "the most important principle of all municipal law of Anglo-Saxon origin,
that a man shall only be liable' to be called on to answer for civil wrongs in the
forum of his home, and tribunal of his vicinage .... 1112 Not only did the
writer of a textbook written in 1880 "3 quote this statement with apparent
approval but he also expressed his approval of a vigorous dissent from an 1865
decision of a New York court holding service within the state sufficient to
establish jurisdiction in a suit between nonresidents for a tort committed out-
side the state." 4 The dissenting judge, apparently on a theory of lack of juris-
diction rather than forum non conveniens, would have declined, at least in the
case of a non-citizen plaintiff, to proceed "against the citizen of another for-
eign state, while seeking our hospitality....
action.... ." Compare text at note 121 infra, discussing the probable practice of early courts
to decline jurisdiction in the absence of such reasons for its assertion.
In Canadian practice, transient jurisdiction over aliens has been assumed only where
required for the plaintiff's protection, as in a case where a United States citizen resided in
a territory without civil courts, so that the forum invoked was "the nearest spot where the
plaintiff can litigate his rights." Macaulay v. O'Brien, 5 B.C.R. 510, 515 (B.C. 1897).
Concerning Australian law, see Coox, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS 96 (1949). In general, see READ, op. cit. supra note 98, at 151.
108. Compare Thomson v. The Nanny, 23 Fed. Cas. 1104, No. 13984 (D.S.C. 1805),
with Heredia v. Davis, 7 F.2d 741. (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 12 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1926) (no
remedy under law of foreign forum). See, generally, Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 CORN. L.Q. 12
(1949) ; Coffey, Jurisdiction over Foreigners in Admiralty Courts, 13 CALIF. L. REV. 93
(1925); EHaRENZWEIG, FRAGISTAS & YIANNOPOULOs, GREEK-AMERICAN PRIVATE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (forthcoming).
109. Thus, in Bishop v. Vose, 27 Conn. 1 (1853), defendant, who had come to Con-
necticut to try a case against the plaintiff, was served with process in that state in a suit
upon a New York contract when about to board a train. The Connecticut court upheld this
service. But instead of referring to a transient rule permitting any defendant in a transi-
tory action to be "caught" within the state, the court simply asked itself "why should our
citizens be obliged to go into a foreign jurisdiction in pursuit of their debtors, when those
debtors are here... ?" Id. at 12.
110. See note 33 supra. In admiralty, the vessel upon which the cause of action arose
would ordinarily be within the court's jurisdiction.
111. See, e.g., Bishop v. Vose, 27 Conn. L (1853).
112. Coleman's Appeal, 75 Pa. 441, 458 (1874).
113. 1 WELLS, JURISDICTION OF COURTS 79 (1880).
114. Id. at 76.
115. Latourette v. Clarke, 45 Barb. 327, 331, 333 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1st Dist. 1865).
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Where and so long as personal jurisdiction was limited to the convenient
forum, there was no need, and indeed no room, for a doctrine of forum non
conveniens.11 Significantly, it was those cases involving suits between aliens-
in which courts inclined to ignore this limitation 217-that initiated the gradual
change in theory and terminology that ultimately led to a transformation of
the concept of jurisdiction itself. This transformation is well illustrated by
the interpretative history of the early New York case, Gardner v. Thomas,"8
which involved the dismissal on jurisdictional grounds of a suit between two
Bristish subjects on a tort committed on a British vessel on the high seas.
The opinion in the case stated that although New York courts "may take
cognizance" of such causes of action, "it must, on principles of policy, often
rest in the sound discretion of the court to afford jurisdiction or not, accord-
ing to the circumstances of the case."" 9 This case, it was held, was an im-
proper one for "extending" jurisdiction; the trial court ought to have "re-
fused" jurisdiction.120 Gardner v. Thomas is frequently cited as the earliest
example of a court's discretionary refusal to exercise an existing jurisdiction-
i.e., as the earliest application of a doctrine of forum non conveniens correcting
an earlier transient rule. This view overlooks, however, the fact that the juris-
diction to which the words "afford," "extend" and "refuse" are related, was
that jurisdiction under public international law which was discussed in so
many decisions of this period ;121 and that here, as in other cases cited for a
doctrine of forum non conveniens supplementing a broad rule of personal
jurisdiction, American domestic jurisdiction was not declined but denied, 122
116. Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. Rav. 908, 911-14 (1947),
makes the point that so-called "discretionary" dismissal was often actually nondiscretionary
because it turned on a question of law. This is, I suggest, the primary reason for the much
discussed fact that the doctrine of forum non conveniens was not adopted until recently and
then only with considerable hesitation. See also Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Con-
',eniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380, 388 (1947). It may not be a coincidence that the Scottish
predecessor of the doctrine, the plea of forum non competens, was applicable to cases of
both non-existence and non-exercise of jurisdiction, Id. at 387. See also note 122 infra.
117. See text at notes 106-07 supra. As to the practice of early American courts,
"without benefit of the Latin phrase," to refuse jurisdiction in suits between aliens, see
Barrett, supra note 116, at 387 n.36; Braucher, supra note 116, at 911-15.
118. 14 Johns. 134 (N.Y. 1817).
119. Id. at 137-38.
120. Id. at 138.
121. See Chief Justice Marshall's opinions in Mason v. The Ship Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) *240 (1804) ; Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) *241 (1808), and cases relied on
therein. See also The Bee, 3 Fed. Cas. 41, No. 1219 (D. Me. 1836) ("established principles
of the jus gentium") ; Campbell v. Wilson, 6 Tex. 379, 391 (1851) ; STORY, COMMENTARIES
UN THE CoNFicr OF LAws 450, 453, 458, 492 (1834). See, generally, Ehrenzweig, Ameri-
can Conflicts Law in Its Historical Perspective, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 133, 139 (1954);
Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 795, 799,
802-09 (1955).
122. The following two types of decisions can, I believe, most properly be rationalized
in this sense: (I) Those admiralty cases where refusal to take jurisdiction depended, at
least in part, on the merits. E.g., Mason v. The Ship Blaireau, supra note 121; Bucker v.
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in close approximation to earlier English theory and practice. 123
This apparent self-restraint in the assumption of jurisdiction is perhaps ex-
plainable on the ground that, prior to the establishment of the requirement
of intrastate service by Pennoyer v. Neff, there was little need for the modern
rule of catch-as-catch-can. As Justice Hunt so convincingly showed in his
vigorous dissent, that case was preceded by a "long established practice under
the statutes of the States of this Union,"'124 whereby substituted service could
be had in actions against any nonresident owning property within the state-
or in other words in almost all cases where transient jurisdiction would ordi-
narily be invoked. And these statutes, even without attachment of the property,
apparently conferred in personam, not merely quasi in rem, jurisdiction 12p_
recognizing in effect what in civil law countries is known as "competency"
based on property,126 a concept completely foreign to the myth of "power"
Klorkgeter, 4 Fed. Cas. 555, No. 2083 (S.D.N.Y. 1849) ; Davis v. Leslie, 7 Fed. Cas. 134,
No. 3639 (S.D.N.Y. 1849); Thomson v. The Nanny, 23 Fed. Cas. 1104, No. 13984
(D.S.C. 1805) ; Willendson v. Forsoket, 29 Fed. Cas. 1283, No. 17682 (D. Pa. 1801). See,
generally, Bickel, supra note 108, at 22; Comment, 31 TEX. L. REy. 889 (1953). (2) Those
cases from Molony v. Dows, 8 Abb. Prac. 316 (N.Y. 1859), to De la Bouillerie v. De
Vienne, 300 N.Y. 60, 89 N.E.2d 15 (1949), and White v. Boston & M.R.R., 283 App. Div.
482, 129 N.Y.S.2d 15 (3d Dep't \1954), in which New York courts have consistently de-
clined jurisdiction on foreign tortiin suits between nonresidents while conceding an absolute
jurisdictional right to residents.
123. See Brinley v. Avery, Kirby 25 (Conn. 1786), perhaps the earliest reported state
case on the subject, where defendant's plea in abatement was ruled sufficient in a suit be-
tween two British subjects, apparently on grounds of reciprocity, because "by the law of
nations, no such action can be supported, nor can the subjects of this state, by the laws of
England, or of other nations, maintain any action against each other on any contract made,
or for any injury done, within the jurisdiction of said state, in any court of the British
dominions, or in any other foreign court." Id. at 26.
124. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,736,737 (1877).
125. See, e.g., the law of the Province of East Jersey of 1693, giving the effect of per-
sonal arrest with apparent complete personal (rather than quasi in rem) jurisdiction to the
service of summons on members of the family of an absent defendant owning realty within
the state. Laws Passed Between 1682 and 1702, c. IX, reprinted in THE GRANTS, CON-
CESSIO S, AND ORIGINAL CoNSTiTu'IoNs OF NEv JERSEY 266 (2d ed., Leaming & Spicer
1881) ; cf. EDSALL, JOURNAL OF THE COURTS OF COM-MON RIGHT AND CHANCERY OF EAST
NEw JERSEY 41 (1937). Even the distinction between local and transitory actions had tem-
porarily lost its relevance as to foreign causes of action. See FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 567
(3d ed. 1886) ; Kuhn, Local and Transitory Actions in Private International Law, 66 U.
PA. L. REV. 301, 305 (1918) ; and particularly the opinion of Hunt, J., in Pennoyer v. Neff,
supra note 124, at 738-40. Many of these statutes are still in effect and are apparently re-
gaining vitality as the Pennoyer doctrine loses force. Cf. Ehrenzweig & Mills, Personal
Service outside the State, 41 CALIF. L. REy. 383 (1953). As to the related practice in
admiralty, see ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 357-90 (1939).
126. See, e.g., JURisDIITIoNsNoRm § 99 (Austria) ; ZIVILROZESSORDNUNG § 23 (Ger-
many) ; 1 Ekel6f, KOMPENDIUM OVER CIVIL PROCESSEN 129 (Sweden) (1948) ; Code of Civil
Procedure of the Province of Quebec, art. 94(4). See also note 3 supra; Millar, Jurisdic-
tion over Absent Defendants: Two Chapters in American Civil Procedure, 14 LA. L. REV.
321 (1954). For a reference in this respect to the "public law of Europe," see Story, J., in
The Jerusalem, 13 Fed. Cas. No. 7293, at 562 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814).
[Vol. 65: 29
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
over the person. Indeed, in many cases early American courts expressly held
personal service within the state dispensable for the establishment of personal
jurisdiction,127 even in the absence of property, 128 at least for intrastate en-
forcement. 129 For "every citizen is entitled to the powers of the courts to en-
force his rights of action against nonresidents."'h a That there was stress on
service within the state is of course explainable without resort to power con-
cepts, on the basis that, service by mail not being yet in use, the server's au-
thority had to be limited to the territory of his state.
This parallelism between American and English law 13' could not last for-
ever. The fundamental differences between the international relations of Eng-
land and the interstate relations of the United States could not but produce
different legal rules. It was easy for early English courts in an appropriate
case to deny recognition to a judgment issuing from a foreign court "not hav-
ing jurisdiction," meanwhile asserting much leeway in assuming jurisdiction.
127. See the authorities collected and discussed by Hunt, J., dissenting in Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 736-37. See also Bartlet'v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401, 409 (1805). But
"decisions in all the states (were] not in unison," Rogers v. Coleman, 3 Ky. 413, 415 (1808),
and even before Pennoyer some of the states required personal service for the establishment
of personal jurisdiction. See cases cited in note 39 supra, and the following cases cited in
1 BEALE, CONFLICT oF LAWS 286 (1935), for the pre-Pennoyer validity of the Pennoyer
doctrine: D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 174 (1850) ; Osborn v. Lloyd, 1 Root 301 (Conn.
1791); Whittier v. Wendell, 7 N.H. 257 (1834) ; Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121 (N.Y.
1818) ; Miller's Executors v. Miller, 1 Bail. Eq. 242 (S.C. 1829). In these cases, lack of
notice rather than of power is regularly given as the rationale of the rule requiring personal
service within the state. See also Picquet v. Swan, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11134 (D. Mass. 1848)
Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380 (1822); Fenton v. Garlick, 8 Johns. 150 (N.Y. 1811);
Hitchcock v. Aicken, 1 Caines 460, 473 (N.Y. 1803); and, generally, Rheinstein, supra
note 121, at 793. Other cases cited by Professor Beale are not in point, such as Miller v.
Sharp, 24 Va. (3 Rand) 41 (1824) ; Don v. Lippmann, 5 C. & F. 1, 7 Eng. Rep. 303 (H.L.
1837) ; or else leave open the permissibility of either constructive service or of nonresidents
owning (unattached) property in the state, e.g., Hopkirk v. Bridges, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.)
413 (1808) ; Skinner v. McDaniel, 4 Vt. 418 (1832) ; or of notice by means other than per-
sonal service, Wood v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500 (1846). Thus a Massachusetts judgment
was denied recognition in Kilbourn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37 (N.Y. 1809), but granted
recognition in Smith v. Rhoades, 1 Conn. 168 (1803), because notice had not been denied.
Perhaps the oldest reported case on the subject is Kibbe v. Kibbe, Kirby 119 (Conn. 1786),
refusing recognition to a Massachusetts judgment lacking "legal jurisdiction of the cause,"
id. at 126, where personal service had been obtained outside the state upon the attachment
of a handkerchief, id. at 123. See also Phelps v. Holker, 1 Pa. 261 (1788) ; Rogers v. Cole-
man, supra.
128. Nelson v. Omaley, 6 Me. 218 (1829) ; Butterworth v. Kinsey, 14 Tex. 495 (1855)
Mc'Mullen v. Guest, 6 Tex. 275 (1851). Cases not recognizing service outside of the state
were distinguished in the Butterworth and McMldlen cases on the ground that the plaintiffs
in such cases were not residents of the state.
129. Wilson v. Zeigler, 44 Tex. 657 (1876) ; Jarvis v. Barrett, 14 Wis. 591 (1861).
130. Butterworth v. Kenney, 14 Tex. 495, 500 (1855).
131. STonY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS §§ 543, 554 (1834), while in
general relying primarily on continental sources, follows English international conflicts
cases concerning the law of jurisdiction. See particularly id. at 466.
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But American courts were increasingly disinclined to relitigate a sister state's
case on jurisdictional grounds and thus to invite similar relitigation of their
own decisions elsewhere. If credit was to be given to the sister state judgment
even against citizens of the recognizing state, definite standards had to be
adopted by which the propriety of such judgments and of the underlying
statutes was to be measured. Natural law at first, and later the full faith and
credit and due process clauses of the Constitution, supplied the basis for a
new concept of "jurisdiction" in which "local" and "interstate" jurisdiction
were to merge.
132
But, contrary to Professor Beale's assumption, the law concerning the
sufficiency and the necessity of personal service within the state in personal
actions, far from being an "unchangeable" principle of a common law of
"physical power," remained unsettled at least until the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Pennoyer v. Neff in 1877. In that case, with
little warning,13 3 the Supreme Court declared that in a personal action only
personal service within the state would do. And this although England, faced
with similar problems created by growing migration and commerce, had
twenty-five years before chosen the opposite solution of permitting service of
process outside the realm whenever the court had a sufficient contact with the
case.1
3 4
When the law thus came to compel the plaintiff to "catch" his defendant, it
quite consistently began to hold this feat sufficient for the establishment of
jurisdiction.'3 3 Thus and then the transient rule came into being; and only
thus and then there also arose the need for a doctrine that would permit the
court to alleviate the hardships created by this new rigid system of "personal
jurisdiction." Injunctions became necessary and permissible to counter harass-
ment of the defendant or avoidance of domestic law by the bringing of suits
132. See, generally, Rheinstein, supra note 121.
133. Only seventeen years earlier, in the much relied-on case, Nations v. Johnson, 65
U.S. (24 How.) 195, 203 (1860), the Supreme Court declared that what was "essential to
the jurisdiction of all courts" was "notice" to the defendant, actual or constructive, giving
the defendant "an opportunity to make his defence"-a far cry from the "power" rule. But
cf. Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812 (1869), declaring "null and void" an
English judgment based on personal service in this country.
134. See note 71 supra. 1
135. This has never been the case in the federal courts. The Judiciary Act of Sept.
24, 1789, § 11, 1 STAT. 78, did not require the defendant's presence within the district,
if he was not an "inhabitant of the United States," Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
300, 329 (1838), or was an "inhabitant" of the district. And on the other hand, diversity
jurisdiction was never based on mere presence since one of the parties had to be a citizen
of the state "where the suit is brought." Abolition of the last requirement by the Act of
March 3, 1875, 18 STAT. 470, which extended diversity jurisdiction to controvcrsies "be-
tween citizens of different States," and thus seemed to facilitate jurisdiction over mere
transients, was soon followed by the limitation of this jurisdiction to "the district of the
residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant." Act of March 3, 1887, 24 STAT. 552.
See, generally, Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts--Suggestions
for Reform, 7 VAND. L. REv. 608, 609 (1954) ; Note, 60 YALE L.J. 183, 186 (1951).
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in other states "having" such jurisdiction over the defendant;136 and quite
generally courts began to claim a right to decline this jurisdiction in their free
discretion. The non-law of forum non conveniens replaced the law of forum
conveniens. But when this stage was reached the counter movement was al-
ready on its way.
The Rule of Pennoyer v. Neff
"The process of a court of one State cannot run into another.... Notice
sent outside the State to a nonresident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an
action against him personally for money recovery.' 3 7, Thus the Supreme Court
stated the rule of Pennoyer v. Neff in 1927, only to honor it in the breach by
adding another of the exceptions 13 that have become so significant in number
and weight that they have virtually overwhelmed the rule itself.
There are at least four typical situations in which a state may acquire per-
sonal jurisdiction over a person without personal service within the state. (1)
The defendant may have "consented" to the jurisdiction prior or subsequent
to the service of process, and thus precluded himself from attacking the juris-
diction of the court, 13 9 general appearance being equivalent to consent.' 40 (2)
Jurisdiction may properly be based upon less than personal service within the
136. See, e.g., Weaver v. Alabama Great So. R.R., 200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364 (1917) ;
Wabash Ry. v. Peterson, 187 Iowa 1331, 175 N.W. 523 (1919). See, generally, Messner,
The Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity over Persons to Compel the Doing of Acts outside
the Territorial Limits of the State, 14 MINN. L. REV. 494, 495-506 (1930) ; Note, 27 IowA
L. REV. 76,99 (1941).
137. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352,355 (1927).
138. Hess v. Pawloski, supra note 137, upheld the constitutionality of the Massachusetts
nonresident motorist statute, permitting substituted service of process upon the state's regis-
trar of motor vehicles, and making such service, together with actual notice to the non-
resident motorist, sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.
139. See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) ; RESTATEmENT CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 81 (1934). Consent stipulations can, however, easily be abused by parties with stronger
bargaining power, particularly through contracts of adhesion. See Ehrenzweig, Adhesion
Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 1072 (1953), cited with approval by
Frank, J., dissenting in Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 206 (2d Cir.
1955). Protective legislation has therefore been enacted by several states, and courts have
been inclined to interpret such stipulations restrictively. Cf. Pope v. Hekscher, 266 N.Y.
114,194 N.E. 53 (1934).
140. Special appearance may be turned into general appearance by statute. York v.
Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890). Appearance solely for the purpose of defending an interest
in attached property may be held to turn jurisdiction quasi in rem into personal jurisdic-
tion. See Frumer & Graziano, Jurisdictional Dilemma of the Nonresident Defendant in
New York-A Proposed Solution, 19 FoRDHAm L. REV. 125 (1950). Appearance to contest
foreclosure in mechanics lien proceedings has been treated similarly. Campbell v. Murdock,
90 F. Supp. 297 (N.D. Ohio 1950). But see Note, 51 COLUIN. L. REV. 242 (1951). Follow-
ing FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b), some states have enacted legislation securing the defendant's
right to attack jurisdiction without consenting to it. See N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, SIX-
TEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 197,215 (1950).
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state, if it is held to "continue" from a prior proceeding.' 4' (3) A state may
extend its concept of "proper" personal service within the state to permit
"substituted" service-other than service on the defendant from hand to
hand. 14 2 And (4) in a long line of decisions based partly on an illusory con-
cept of "implied consent,"1 43 the requirement of personal service has been
diluted by permitting either "constructive service" (service by publication, or
upon agents) within the state, combined with deposit in the mail, or personal
service outside the state. 4 4 There are numerous situations in which statutory
provisions for such service have been held constitutional as providing a basis
for personal jurisdiction, although, notwithstanding much language of the courts
to the contrary, 45 physical power fails completely as a rationale. These hold-
141, This lack of insistence on continuing "physical power" has been called by Justice
Holmes "one of the decencies of civilization that no one would dispute." Michigan Trust
Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 353 (1913). But the concept of retained jurisdiction is anything
but clear where it is applied to other actions treated as "essential concomitants" of the
original suit. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916), holding that
there was no jurisdiction without personal service in a second action which was separate
and distinct from a prior action where there had been personal service. Problems of re-
tained jurisdiction most frequently arise in actions of support and child custody, particularly
where ill-conceived notions of finality and comity induce the court of a sister state to refuse
sole or concurrent jurisdiction because of "continuing" jurisdiction elsewhere. See Ehren-
zweig, Interstate Recognition of Support Duties, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 382 (1954) ; Comment,
41 id. at 692 (1953).
142. The traditional English practice favors service by private persons. Millar,
CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 85 (1952). Both the
Federal Rules, FED. R. CIr. P. 4(c), and the majority of states, however, prescribe service
by an officer. After a long history of rigidity, a trend toward greater informality and
efficiency has been apparent for some time. See Sunderland, The Problem of Jurisdiction,
4 TEX. L. REV. 429, 444 (1926). Recent statutes provide for service by mail at least as an
alternative method, and a wider use of this most effective means of communication, gen-
erally adopted in other countries, has been repeatedly suggested. See N.Y. JUDICIAL COUN-
CIL, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT 327, 330 (1942).
143. See Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953).
144. See, e.g., CALIF. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 412, 413 (1953) ; Allen v. Superior Court,
41 Cal. 2d 306, 259 P.2d 905 (1953). Whatever attempts can be made to secure actual noti-
fication are jealously insisted upon by the courts in their solicitude for the defendant. See
Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 19 (1928) ; McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917).
The rule of the Wuchter case, though based on the Constitution, was even applied to a
nonresident motorist statute of a foreign country, which did not provide for adequate
notice. Boivin v. Talcott, 102 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Ohio 1951). Whether the service statute
must provide for a registered return receipt or mailing to the last known address is suffi-
cient, is not clear.
145. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940), basing the "authority of a state
over" a departed citizen on the privileges and protection afforded to him. When the fading
distinction between citizens and residents has disappeared this rationale will have lost all
remaining justification. Cf. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES Or THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 87 (1942) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 193 n.101 (3d ed. 1949) ; Reese, Does
Domicil Bear a Single Meaning?, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 589 (1955) ; Reese & Green, That
Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 VAND. L. REV. 561, 569, 580 (1953). This conclusion Would
be definitively confirmed if the United States Supreme Court were to follow the California
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ings concern defendants who were concealing themselves to avoid process, 146
were domiciled, 147 carried on business,
148 owned certain kinds of property 140
or had performed certain acts 150 within the state of the forum.
In view of these "exceptions" there seems to be little left of the rule of Pen-
noyer v. Neff save the amorphous formula of fair play and substantial justice
well known to us from the law of jurisdiction over corporations.151 It may
well be that in the law of jurisdiction over individuals, as in that of jurisdiction
over foreign corporations, a substantial "minimum contact" will ultimately be
Supreme Court in upholding constructive service in certain cases even upon former resi-
dents. See Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal.2d 259, 288 P.2d 497 (1955) ; Ehrenzweig & Mills, Per-
sonal Service outside the State, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1953).
146. See, e.g., CALIF. CODE CIV. PRoc., § 412 (1953) ; see also GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 192 (3d ed. 1949).
147. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940). For pre-Milliken law to the same
effect, see, e.g., Harryman v. Roberts, 52 Md. 64, 75 (1879).
148. "Power" language had long prevented progress here, too. Compare Flexner v.
Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919), with Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623
(1935). See, generally, BLUME, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 276 (1955) ; Culp, Process
against Non-Residents Doing Business within a State, 32 MIcH. L. REv. 909 (1934) ; Scott,
Jurisdiction over Non-Residents Doing Business within the State, 32 HARV. L. REv. 871
(1919).
149. In countries in which the defendant's forum is the primary basis of personal juris-
diction, see text at note 56 supra, a supplementary "property forum" of non-domiciliaries
has been recognized in certain cases. See Millar, Jurisdiction over Absent Defendants:
Two Chapters in Anerican Civil Procedure, 14 LA. L. REv. 321 (1954). In the United
States in personam jurisdiction over one not present or domiciled in the state has occasional-
ly been granted when a cause of action arises in the state from such a person's ownership
of certain types of property. Dubin v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (C.P. Phila. Co.
1938). The Restaters, with little support in law or reason, would limit this rule to things
"dangerous to life or property." RESTATEM.ENT, JUDGMENTS § 23 (1942). As to jurisdiction
quasi in rem see, generally, STUMBEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 104-09 (2d ed. 1951). The notice
rationale of such jurisdiction fails where the thing cannot be readily located, as in the case
of intangibles. For a history of garnishment in the United States and in England, see
Mussman & Riesenfeld, Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 MINN. L. REv. 1, 7 (1942). For
an attempt at solving the problem caused by a breakdown of both the notice and the power
rationales in this field, see STUMBERG, op. cit. supra, at 109.
150. Power language originally supported the doctrine of Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.
352 (1927), upholding a statute that provided for constructive service upon a state officer
against nonresident motorists in actions arising from accidents within the state. An ex-
tension of the doctrine to airplanes would still be reconcilable with the Restatement limit-
ing this doctrine to acts "dangerous to life or property." RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 23
(1942). See Peters v. Robin Airlines, 281 App. Div. 903, 120 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2d Dep't 1953).
This would not hold true for the extension advocated by Joiner, Let's have Michigan Torts
Decided in Michigan Courts, 31 MICH. STATE B.J. 5, 12 (1952), who would provide for
in personam jurisdiction through service outside the state in the case of all domestic torts.
If this suggestion were adopted, together with a similar proposal that has been made re-
garding local contracts, Note, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 792 (1951), we should not be far from
the English rule which includes domestic transactions in general, see text at note 71 supra;
THE ANNUAL PRACtiCE 93-94 (1954). As to rules followed elsewhere, see Sunderland,
supra note 142, at 442.
151. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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the touchstone of permissible jurisdiction. The question will then arise whether
this formula, whose extreme flexibility is hardly preferable to the extreme
rigidity of the classical rule of physical personal service, will not need to be
supplemented by criteria developed within the civilian laws of competency, 1 2
or, more likely, within the common law of forum non conveniens. 153
But be this as it may, the transient rule, declaring sufficient personal service
within the state upon nonresidents sued by other nonresidents on foreign causes
of actions, is most easily explainable as a relic of the Pennoyer rule which
declares such service to be requ#-ed for the establishment of personal juris-
diction. Once this requirement, breaking down under an increasing number
of "exceptions," ceases to be valid, its creature the transient rule may have
reached the end of its course and left the way open for a new approach, satis-
fying new needs.
THE NEED: INTERSTATE VENUE IN THE FoRUM CONVENIENS
Slowly and painfully, American courts are developing a common law of
forum non conveniens as a corrective of the serious shortcomings in a law of
personal jurisdiction based on mere personal service.1 4 But the time may
have arrived for a more radical reform, reversing the historical process by
which, over the last century, this law of jurisdiction has reached its present
unsatisfactory state. I have suggested that mere transient service has come to
be sufficient for the establishment of personal jurisdiction because personal
service had come to be required under the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff. Once
this doctrine has been deprived of its vitality either by a decision overruling
it or by the continuing erosion by exceptions, the primary reason for the con-
tinued existence of the transient rule will have disappeared. Forum non con-
veniens, which now allows discretionary refusal to "take" existing jurisdiction,
may then assume the positive function of identifying the forum conveniens in
terms of substantial contacts such as the plaintiff's residence, the origin of the
cause of action or the presence of property.
Professor Barrett, dealing with the federal courts, suggests that many exist-
ing problems in this field would be alleviated by a scheme of nationwide service
of process, venue rules looking to the forum's reasonable contacts with the
case, and correction of abuses by a discretionary, nonappealable right of trans-
152. See notes 3, 59, 126, 149 supra and accompanying text.
153. Judge Learned Hand has, in a series of decisions, stressed the growing similarity
of the tests used in determining jurisdiction over corporations and in balancing the con-
veniences for forum non conveniens. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141
(2d Cir. 1930) ; Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry., 166 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 814 (1948) ; Latimer v. S/S Industrias Reunidas F. Mataraze, 175 F.2d 184, 186 (2d
Cir. 1949). For general discussion, and a survey of English practice, see Note, Service on
a Foreign Corporation after Withdrawal from the Forum State: The Merger of Jurisdic-
tion and Forum Non Conveniens, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 392, 394 (1952).
154. See Barrett, supra note 116, at 410; Braucher, supra note 116, at 917.
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fer to a more convenient forum.l 55 I submit that similar rules could and should
be developed for the state courts in order to solve some of the problems
created by intrastate service requirements on the one hand, and the transient
rule on the other.
It is becoming apparent that the Supreme Court of the United States will
be increasingly inclined to uphold legislation providing for out-of-state process
if combined with fair notice and if issuing from states with minimum contacts
(such as defendant's residence or place of the cause of action).156 Once "per-
sonal jurisdiction" has thus been modified, the plaintiff will no longer be forced
into the venture of "catching" the defendant, and there will no longer be any
need for transient service.
Chances are good that legislatures might expand the jurisdiction of their
courts by providing for out-of-state service.V57 But there is little hope that
courts or legislatures will be willing to forego personal jurisdiction over the
transient so long as they cannot be certain that the transient's home state will
execute a judgment based on out-of-state service, and assist the domestic plain-
tiff in the prosecution of his claim. A mechanism for the interstate transfer
of cases, on the model of the Federal Judicial Code, 158 would offer such cer-
tainty by determining and securing what might be called an "interstate venue."
Federal legislation to this effect, while desirable and probably constitutional
under the full faith and credit clause, is unlikely. Until uniform legislation 159
can be obtained, however, there is no good reason why the legislature of any
state should not be willing to consider a statute aimed at a similar result, based
on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. At the 1953 session of the California
legislature a bill was passed (but vetoed by the Governor) which would have
permitted the nonresident defendant in the absence of certain contacts (resi-
dence and cause of action) to move for a dismissal of the action accompanied
by an interlocutory order based on a party agreement securing the plaintiff
effective prosecution of his claim in another jurisdiction.' 60 Such a law would
at least have mitigated the rigors of the transient rule, assuring the plaintiff of
the opportunity to bring his defendant into court yet protecting the defendant
against captious choice of forum.
The Pennoyer rule is on the way out, having reached the end of its brief
usefulness. And when the myth of Pennoyer has finally dissolved in rapidly
155. Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions for
Reform, 7 VANm. L. REv. 608, 635 (1954).
156. See notes 144-45 supra. For detailed analysis, see Ehrenzweig & Mills, Personal
Service outside the State, 41 CALIF. L. Rv. 383 (1953).
157. Such out-of-state service might be combined with the institution of the curator
absentis, now in operation in four states. See Millar, Jurisdiction over Absent Defendants:
Two Chapters in American Civil Procedure, 14 LA. L. Ray. 321 (1954).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1952).
159. See, e.g., Note, A Proposed Uniform Act for Extra-Territorial Personal Service
and Jurisdiction, 33 VA. L. REv. 187 (1947).
160. Cal. S. Bill No. 1960 (1953) is set forth in the dissent of Carter, J., in Price v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 42 Cal. 2d 577, 600, 268 P.2d 457, 471 (1954).
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multiplying exceptions, the time will have come for the dissolution of its
submyth, the transient rule, by reversing the process of its creation. Once
jurisdiction over nonresidents, no longer tied to the shibboleth of "physical"
service within the state, has embraced mail, wire and wireless all through the
nation in giving notice of a suit in a convenient court having contacts with
the case, there will be no need for "physically" catching an elusive defendant,
nor for protecting him against an inconvenient forum. And pseudo-medieval
formulas established and perpetuated by nineteenth century conceptualism,
which for decades have obstructed the free flow of legal progress, will have been
replaced by what may become known as the new and old American common
law of interstate venue in the forum conveniens.
